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Chapter at a glance
– The study’s conceptual framework is presented.
– This chapter illustrates the role of regulation and 
technological progress for the development of the 
electric power system and introduces the energy 
policy triangle covering the three main energy 
policy goals reliability, affordability, and sustain-
ability.
– The concept of and the motivation for smart grids 
are introduced.
– Fundamental premises highlighting the role of the 
government and new market actors in the smart 
grid development process are presented.
2.1 The power sector supply chain 
and regulatory environment 
of smart grids
The supply chain model of the electric power 
sector The delivery of electricity from generation 
sources to end consumers involves a multitude of 
technologies, actors, and processes, especially in the 
context of the development of an intelligent future-
oriented power grid infrastructure. Therefore, it is 
useful to employ a supply chain model of the electric 
power sector (or electricity system) to structure the 
debate on smart grids. 
In this study, a smart grid supply chain model 
(see . Fig. 2.1) is used to structure the discussion 
on China’s and Germany’s power systems along with 
their most pressing problems and challenges as well 
as their particular approach of how to promote the 
development of smart grids. The model subdivides 
all activities/processes, technologies, and actors of 
the power sector supply (or value) chain into four 
basic elements:1- Power Generation: the technical generation of electricity using various kinds of primary en-
ergy sources (such as coal, gas, nuclear, hydro, 
1 The smart grid supply chain model being referred to in this 
study is based on the so-called Energy Process Management 
(EPM) model [16].
wind, and solar energy) and corresponding 
ancillary services.2- Power Logistics: the transmission, distribution, storage, and metering of electricity.- Power Trade & Retail: purchasing, trading, and selling electricity, as well as retail and billing 
services for end consumers.- Power Consumption: the end use of electricity by different end-user segments, e. g. rural and 
urban households, industrial and commercial 
consumers.
To capture the importance of ICT for transform-
ing the traditional power sector into a smart grid, a 
corresponding fifth element is added to the model: - Information & Communication: operating, monitoring, and controlling power system 
components, as well as power system-related 
information exchange between various market 
actors with the help of ICT along all four stages 
of the power sector supply chain. 
The government plays a pivotal role in the smart 
grid development process (see ▶ Sect. 2.3) as a guid-
ing and supervising key player affecting processes 
and businesses across all five supply chain elements.
The regulatory environment of smart grids In 
the remainder of this study, six regulatory areas will 
be used to describe the regulatory environments of 
China’s and Germany’s power systems. 
The six regulatory areas are:- Policy Setting and Fundamental Institutions: Government leadership in form of policies, 
laws, and regulation is essential to promote 
smart grid development. To practice such a 
leadership, a governance structure with clearly 
assigned roles and responsibilities for the field of 
(smart) grid regulation is of crucial importance. - Market Structure: The (market) structure of the electric power sector is characterized by all 
2 Ancillary services are functions performed by the equip-
ment and people generating, controlling, transmitting, 
and distributing electricity with the intention of support-
ing basic services of generating capacity, energy supply, 
and power delivery [17]. Examples are load following, 
scheduling and dispatch, real-power loss replacement, and 
voltage control (e. g. by means of reactive power supply).
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the companies involved in the various stages 
of the power sector supply chain from Power 
Generation and Power Logistics to Power Trade 
& Retail (vertical market structure), the mar-
ket composition and competitive conditions at 
different stages of the supply chain (horizontal 
market structure), and the roles and responsi-
bilities of the market actors. - Market Design and RES Integration: Electric-ity prices (for generation and retail) are of 
crucial importance with regard to the utiliza-
tion of different sources of power generation, 
investment decisions for new generation 
capacities, power consumption patterns, and 
investments in power saving technologies. By 
setting monetary incentives for investments 
into power generation capacities, generation 
electricity prices contribute particularly to the 
long-term coordination of power generation 
and consumption. At the same time, retail 
electricity prices have the power to directly 
affect the patterns of electricity consumption of 
end users. The formation of electricity prices is 
heavily affected by the market structure and the 
underlying market design, the latter of which is 
generally defined by the government. Feed-in 
tariffs for RES and associated regulations are 
also part of the market design because they 
represent nothing less than prices for electricity 
generation fixed by the government.- Development of Infrastructure and Network Regulation: The regulatory domain explains 
how investments in the (smart) grid infrastruc-
ture can be incentivized through power grid or 
network regulation. These regulatory practices 
directly impact the stable and affordable opera-
tion of the current grid infrastructure and the 




 . Fig. 2.1 Electric power sector supply chain model
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balancing electricity generation and consump-
tion in the short term are described. Many 
smart grid-related technologies facilitate the 
balancing of generation and consumption.- The Role of Information and Communication: Integration of ICT with power system compo-
nents across the supply chain is a key factor in 
smart grid development. This regulatory area 
covers the relevance of ICT companies, stan-
dardization issues, cyber security, and funding 
of smart grid research.
2.2 The role of regulation 
and technological progress 
for the development of electric 
power systems
Regulation in the electric power sector Competition, 
where feasible free from government intervention, is 
generally considered as a very effective way of reduc-
ing production costs, improving quality of supply, and 
increasing product diversity [1], [2]. Yet, competition 
is not always feasible. Especially where natural mo-
nopolies prevail, competition cannot exist and gov-
ernment regulation is necessary [3]. 
Transmission and distribution grids are such 
natural monopolies. Having an infrastructure of 
overlapping power grids from different competitive 
suppliers would be economically inefficient. Due to 
economies of scale, a single supplier (the monopo-
list) is able to offer the services of the electric power 
grid at lower costs. However, the monopolistic grid 
operator has a strong incentive to set high prices for 
its services or to scrimp on quality. Thus, the price 
and quality of service of the monopolistic grid oper-
ator must be regulated to protect grid users against 
the monopolist’s market power [3].3
3 Note that, at the beginning of the electrification process, 
the power generation sector was also recognized as a 
natural monopoly: in the absence of power transmission 
lines, competition between power generation units from 
different cities or regions was not possible. With the rather 
small electricity demand in separated cities or regions, one 
larger power plant was able to provide the electric power at 
lower costs than many small competitive power plants due 
to economies of scale. However, the gradual deployment 
of transmission lines allowed competition between large 
power plants to evolve in such a manner that power genera-
tion is no longer considered to be a natural monopoly [3]. 
It is common to distinguish two related goals of 
monopoly regulation [3] which are both typically 
tasks for the regulator, like the Federal Network 
Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post 
and Railway (BNetzA) in Germany:- Control of revenues and prices of the networks (i. e. network charges)- Secure access to the monopolistic infrastruc-ture (i. e. the network) to facilitate competition 
among market actors in the commercial parts 
of the electricity value chain (e. g. generation, 
trade and retail).
Moreover, the internalization of so-called externali-
ties is a frequently cited argument in favor of gov-
ernment intervention even in the non-monopolistic 
parts of the electric power system:- Negative externalities: the generation of elec-tricity is often connected to emissions of en-
vironmental pollutants. Without government 
intervention, neither producers nor consumers 
of electricity are sufficiently incentivized to 
behave in an environmentally friendly manner. 
Therefore, actions of the government such as 
pollution control laws, energy taxes, and subsi-
dies for environmentally friendly technologies 
are used to reign in commercial activities and 
advance the overall societal objectives like en-
vironment protection and sustainable develop-
ment [1]. - Positive externalities: technological progress critically depends on the creation of new 
knowledge. After its creation, knowledge can 
be used over and over by various actors with 
almost no extra costs. From the perspective 
of the whole society, companies often do not 
invest enough in knowledge creation because 
a significant portion of the benefits related to 
knowledge creation accrues to outside stake-
holders, e. g. other companies, institutions, or 
citizens. In this light, government actions such 
as a patent law, a stringent protection of intel-
lectual property rights, or the subsidization of 
R&D can be employed to incentivize companies 
to invest in knowledge creation and innovation.
This study adopts a broad understanding of regula-
tion and does not only focus on network regulation 
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but also upon aspects such as RES integration, in-
novation policies, and standardization. 
A stylized history of power system develop-
ment The historical development of electric power 
systems dates back to the last decades of the 19th 
century in the world’s most advanced countries of 
that era. The electrification process in these coun-
tries was mostly accomplished by the mid-20th cen-
tury, when almost the whole population had access 
to electric power. In less developed regions, the elec-
trification process started somewhat later and pro-
gressed at a considerably slower pace. Differences in 
onset and pace of the electrification process between 
countries can be explained mainly with technologi-
cal, economic, political, and regulatory reasons [4].
In developing their electric power systems, 
many countries followed a similar stylized pathway. 
At the beginning of the electrification process, the 
emergence of new technologies and appliances con-
suming electric power led to a rapidly increasing de-
mand for electricity. Thus, the main objective was to 
connect a growing number of consumers as quickly 
as possible to the electric power grid. The build-up 
process took place in a rather uncoordinated man-
ner with only little government intervention. Thus, 
various small-sized companies set up overlapping 
infrastructures such as small-sized power plants and 
distribution lines. This uncoordinated set-up phase 
was often associated with low power quality and 
reliability as well as high costs. Therefore, govern-
ments started to regulate the electricity sector with 
the intention of making power supply more reliable 
and affordable. Formally assigning monopoly rights 
to power generation companies and grid operators 
created economies of scale, which reduced the over-
all production costs of electric power generation 
and distribution. After this assignment of monopoly 
rights, electricity market regulation became a deci-
sive factor to protect consumers against the market 
power of the newly installed monopolies. 
When a certain level of wealth and economic 
development had been achieved, the awareness of 
environmental protection increased in many societ-
ies.4 Therefore, more emphasis was put on ecological 
4 The positive correlation between economic development 
and environmental preferences has been well docu-
mented during the last two decades [18]. 
sustainability of the electric power system and many 
governments introduced environmental protection 
policies. 
The energy policy triangle The schematic his-
tory presented above reveals that different objec-
tives and regulations were prioritized at different 
development stages of the power system. Whereas 
the provision of widespread and reliable access to 
electricity was often the initial motivation, afford-
ability of electric power emerged as a second driver 
of energy policy after the initial build-up phase. 
Finally, the ecological sustainability of the electric 
power system has often been formulated as a third 
important priority.
Today, governments strive to incorporate all 
three objectives in their power sector regulation. 
They (1) want to provide a reliable and secure elec-
tricity supply for their economies, (2) simultane-
ously promote economic development by ensuring 
affordable electricity prices while (3) also achieving 
ecological sustainability. The three goals reliability, 
affordability, and sustainability are commonly re-
ferred to as the energy policy triangle (see . Fig. 2.2). 
Conflicting nature of the energy policy trian-
gle There are inherent conflicts between the goals 
of the energy policy triangle. A government forcing 
owners of fossil-fuel power plants to install filter 
technologies for the sake of improving air quality, 
for instance, is accepting that costs of power genera-
tion increase. Another government using expensive 
domestic resources for electricity generation instead 
of lower-priced resources available on world mar-
kets accepts higher generation costs for the sake of 
independent and predictable energy supply.
The complete and simultaneous achievement 
of all three policy goals is virtually impossible. 
Therefore, most countries place a priority on one 
or sometimes two policy goals, trying to achieve or 
maintain acceptable levels with regard to the non-
prioritized policy goals. In recent years, the Chinese 
government, for example, prioritized (1) provid-
ing a reliable and secure electricity supply and (2) 
keeping electricity prices for the population at an 
affordable level. On the other hand, it has accepted 
high levels of environmental pollution. The German 
government, in contrast, has been placing a strong 
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emphasis on ecological sustainability since the end 
of the 20th century. A prominent strategic decision 
in this context was the build-up of RES genera-
tion capacities so that currently approximately one 
fourth of Germany’s electricity comes from RES [5]. 
The high share of RES in Germany currently leads 
to increasing challenges with regard to the policy 
goals of reliability and affordability. However, both 
conflicts may be mitigated by means of technologi-
cal progress as well as smart design of policies and 
regulatory framework:- In most cases, electricity generated by means of RES, so-called RES-E, is still more expensive 
than electricity generated in fossil fuel-fired 
power plants. This difference in generation 
costs has contributed significantly to climbing 
end consumer prices for electricity in recent 
years. Nonetheless, RES-E is often already 
cheaper than electricity retail prices (known as 
grid parity) depending on the characteristics 
of location and end-user segment. The costs 
of RES-E have decreased considerably dur-
ing the last few decades and are projected to 
decrease even more with further technological 
advancement and economies of scale through 
worldwide deployment [6]. Someday, the costs 
of renewably generated electricity will conse-
quently fall below those of electricity gener-
ated in conventional power plants. From that 
time on, investments in RES will increase both 
sustainability and affordability of the power 
system provided that the power system and 
market design allow for a minimizing of grid 
integration costs. - With a rising of electric power generated by variable RES, more and more efforts have to 
be undertaken to guarantee the high stabil-
ity and reliability of the power system. Below, 
two examples of temporary RES penetration 
in Germany, a power system with electricity 
loads commonly ranging from 40 to 80 GW, 
are presented: on December 5th 2013, a par-
ticularly windy day, roughly 27 GW of feed-in 
was generated by means of wind turbines in 
Germany [7]. On March 9th 2014, a very sunny 
day, photovoltaic (PV) installations alone fed a 
Sustainability
Reduce detrimental 
consequences for the 
environment and the ecosystem 
Affordability
Achieve a low level of electricity 
prices, for example by means of a 
high degree of compeveness
Reliability
Promote a widespread, reliable, 





 . Fig. 2.2 Energy policy triangle
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peak power of almost 22 GW into the grid [7]. 
Technological progress as well as adaptations 
to the existing design of the electricity market 
in Germany are essential to limit the cost of 
the ongoing transition towards a low carbon 
economy.
2.3 Smart grids – promising 
technological innovations
The concept of smart grids The capabilities of con-
ventional power grids to cope with many of today’s 
technological challenges, e. g. the integration of a 
large share of electricity generated by means of in-
termittent RES, are limited or can only be maintained 
with significant investments. In this light, smart grids 
represent a promising new technological concept. To-
day, the general understanding regarding the concept 
of smart grids seems to converge on a global level. A 
definition of smart grids which has found widespread 
acclaim in the professional community comes from 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) [8]:
» An electricity network that uses digital and other 
advanced technologies to monitor and manage 
the transport of electricity from all generation 
sources to meet the varying electricity demands of 
end users. Smart grids co-ordinate the needs and 
capabilities of all generators, grid operators, end 
users and electricity market stakeholders to oper-
ate all parts of the system as efficiently as possible, 
minimizing costs and environmental impacts 
while maximizing system reliability, resilience and 
stability.
Another explanation of the smart grid concept 
comes from the International Electrotechnical Com-
mission (IEC) [9]: 
» The general understanding is that the Smart Grid 
is the concept of modernizing the electric grid. The 
Smart Grid comprises everything related to the 
electric system in between any point of generation 
and any point of consumption. Through the addi-
tion of Smart Grid technologies the grid becomes 
more flexible, interactive and is able to provide 
real time feedback.
 It is an electricity network that can intelligently 
integrate the actions of all users connected to it – 
generators, consumers and those that do both – in 
order to efficiently deliver sustainable, economic 
and secure electricity supplies.
Irrespective of the common general understanding 
of smart grids, the specific vision of smart grids dif-
fers substantially from case to case and from coun-
try to country. Technologies that are included in one 
smart grid concept are not necessarily included in 
another. 
Motivation for smart grids Smart grids are gener-
ally expected to cope with the most pressing prob-
lems and challenges of many power systems more 
effectively and efficiently than conventional grid 
technologies. Smart grids primarily aim at deliv-
ering enhanced levels of reliability and security of 
supply, facilitating the balancing of electricity gen-
eration and consumption, increasing the utilization 
rate of power system components, and reducing 
investments in the conventional (primary) grid in-
frastructure. Smart grid technologies can be used, 
for example, to- monitor and control electric power grids more effectively, - facilitate the grid connection and operation of generators of all sizes and technologies,- help to integrate electricity generated from intermittent RES, - allow industrial, commercial, and residential consumers to play a part in optimizing the 
operation of the system by adjusting electric-
ity consumption behavior according to supply, 
and- provide consumers with greater information on their electricity consumption enabling 
electricity conservation [9].
The evolutionary character of smart grids Smart 
grids are not built from scratch. Rather, they evolve 
from conventional power grids which are upgraded 
with different kinds of innovative technologies and 
components. These technologies and components 
will be deployed at different periods in time depend-
ing on commercial attractiveness, compatibility 
with existing technologies, regulatory policies, and 
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investment frameworks. The evolutionary pathway 
of smart grid technologies is similar to that of other 
innovations: after major R&D efforts, smart grid 
technologies are developed further in specific dem-
onstration projects, tested in model cities or regions, 
and finally deployed on a larger scale.
Today’s smart grid technology landscape is highly 
diverse with some technologies reaching already 
high levels of maturity and others still in a devel-
opment process. Smart grid-related technologies 
with high levels of maturity are, for example, power 
plant communication and control modules, grid 
control systems, and advanced metering infrastruc-
tures (AMI). On the other hand, technologies such 
as wide area monitoring and control, distribution 
management, or electric vehicle charging infra-
structure require more progress before they are 
mature enough for large-scale deployment [8].
. Figure 2.3 visualizes a stylized evolutionary 
pathway of smart grids: in the past (left part of the 
illustration), electric power was mainly generated in 
thermal power plants. The status of high, medium, 
and low voltage grids was not remotely monitored. 
System operators were able to supervise substations 
at different voltage levels via rudimentary telecon-
trol or by means of manual patrol teams. 
In the present (middle part of the illustration), 
large wind farms complement thermal power plants 
feeding in electricity at the high voltage (HV) level. 
The status of transmission grids and the associated 
substations is remotely monitored. The resulting 
status information is received in the transmission 
control center and can be used to monitor and con-
trol the grid. Medium voltage (MV) and low volt-
age (LV) grids, however, are not yet equipped with 
sophisticated monitoring technologies. The distri-
bution control center only monitors the associated 
substations via telecontrol or by means of manual 
patrol teams. For the first time, small-sized wind 
farms and PV installations are being connected to 
distribution grids. 
In the future (right part of the illustration), 
power grids at all voltage levels are expected to be 
equipped with sophisticated monitoring and control 
technologies. Status information, e. g. on electricity 
generation and consumption, will also be available 
for distribution grids. RES, energy storage installa-
tions, and electric vehicles will become an integral  . Fig. 2.3 Development of smarter power systems (© OECD/
IEA [8])
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part of the future electric power system and will be 
able to exchange status information with the grid.
The role of governments in the smart grid devel-
opment process Given the evolutionary character 
of smart grids and the low maturity levels of some 
smart grid technologies, both a systematic guidance 
and specific government support policies are es-
sential to promote the development of smart grids. 
Exemplary government policies in this context are: - Setting up a government long-term strategy for the development of the future electricity 
system to reduce investment risks for potential 
investors in R&D and deployment of smart 
grid technologies. - Establishing network regulation for transmis-sion and distribution grid operators which 
incentivizes them to invest in smart grid tech-
nologies.- Promoting a non-discriminatory and tech-nology-neutral management of and access 
to power system data to enable companies to 
develop innovative business models making 
use of this data.- Partial government funding of R&D to increase the maturity level of smart grid tech-
nologies.- Supporting smart grid-related standardization, defining technical guidelines and regulations 
to reduce the costs for deployment and inte-
gration of different smart grid components by 
ensuring interoperability.- Promoting the exchange and collaboration between different government organizations, 
power sector companies, academia, associa-
tions, and other relevant actors to create a 
common understanding of smart grids. 
The role of new market actors in the smart grid 
development process In Germany and many other 
countries, one important trend associated with the 
migration towards smart grids and the transition to 
an electricity system relying to an increasing extent 
on RES-E is a rise in the number of market actors 
in the electricity sector. New market actors (third 
parties or non-incumbents) can expand the hori-
zontal market structure by entering into competi-
tion with established companies (incumbents) with 
regard to existing products or services (e. g. opera-
tors of renewable energy plants or new power retail 
companies). New market actors can also expand the 
vertical market structure by being pioneers offer-
ing products and/or services in new market sectors 
or niches (e. g. energy service companies or virtual 
power plant operators5) or in using existing knowl-
edge and/or infrastructure from other sectors in an 
innovative way upgrading products and services in 
the electric power sector (e. g. ICT companies). 
New market actors offer innovative products 
and services that were not supplied by established 
market actors before. In a smart grid context, non-
incumbents create new business models and offer 
new products and services by making use of avail-
able power system information and infrastructure in 
an innovative way. To give some tangible examples 
for the power sector innovations that may be driven 
by third parties, ▶ Sect. 4.4.2 highlights how non-
incumbents in Germany create new business mod-
els in the smart grid development process. Note that 
the German evidence elaborated in ▶ Sect. 4.4.2 also 
demonstrates that new market actors might emerge 
due to government policies aimed explicitly at the 
promotion of competition. 
In expanding the horizontal market structure, 
third parties contribute to an increased level of 
competition. Higher competition levels are usually 
considered to drive innovation, enable greater ef-
ficiency in the allocation of resources, increase cost 
efficiency of power sector enterprises with regard 
to their operations and investments, contribute to 
lower retail price levels, and stimulate innovation 
resulting in a higher variety of competitively priced 
products and services offered to the customer: - With regard to the electric power sector, IEA analyzed the market liberalization process in 
several of its member countries and came to 
the conclusion that higher competition levels 
in the electric power sector contributed to a 
reduction of electricity prices for industrial 
consumers [10]. - With respect to the telecommunication sector, various empirical studies (including data from 
industrial and developing countries) found 
5 Both new market actors are introduced in more detail in 
Sect. 4.4.2. 
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that high competition levels significantly 
increased the overall sector performance and 
led to more landline and mobile telephone 
connections, lower tariffs, and more connec-
tion capacity [11], [12], [13]- In the general economic literature, the rela-tionship between competition and innovation 
has been examined in many theoretical and 
empirical studies. It is usually found that there 
is a kind of optimal market structure for R&D-
spending, innovation and diffusion. Neither 
very low nor very high competition levels 
are an innovation-friendly environment. A 
competitive market with a limited number of 
companies seems to promote innovation best 
[14]. 
Economic efficiency of smart grids The economic 
evaluation of smart grids is still ongoing. How-
ever, early evidence suggests that smart grids are 
an attractive solution compared to conventional 
grid expansion measures. A recent study summa-
rizes the results of twelve smart grid cost-benefit 
analyses published between 2004 and 2012 in the 
United States, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
and the Czech Republic [15]. This overview shows 
that benefits of the investigated smart grid concepts 
outweigh costs in ten of twelve cases (with costs out-
weighing benefits in Denmark and the Czech Re-
public). Only four of these studies compared their 
results to costs and benefits of conventional grid ex-
pansion measures (increasing the grid capacity by 
traditional network expansion). These studies come 
to the conclusion that, from an economic point of 
view, investments in smart grid technologies are 
preferable to conventional expansion measures.
Key findings- Governments strive to provide a reliable, afford-able, and sustainable electricity supply for their 
economies. Yet, there are inherent conflicts be-
tween these three energy policy goals. - Smart grids can be seen as an advanced way of operating grids supported by a broad set of new 
technologies in the areas of communication, me-
tering, control, and automation. Smart grid-related 
operation concepts, technologies, and compo-
nents can be used to upgrade the existing grid 
infrastructure and offer many new possibilities in 
grid management and control. Smart grids will be 
deployed at different periods in time depending 
on requirements of the particular power system, 
compatibility with existing technologies, regula-
tory policies, and investment frameworks.- Recent evidence has shown that investments in smart grid technologies are economically prefer-
able to conventional grid expansion measures. 
Moreover, smart grids represent a promising con-
cept that could increase reliability and security of 
supply, facilitate the balancing of electricity gen-
eration and consumption, ease the grid integra-
tion of electricity generated from variable RES, and 
increase the utilization rate of power grid assets. - Given the evolutionary character of smart grids and the still low maturity levels of some smart 
grid technologies, both systematic guidance and 
specific government support policies are essential 
to promote the development of smart grids. - New market actors in the electric power sector are of crucial importance to promote innovation in the 
electric power sector and speed-up the develop-
ment of smart grids. 
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